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Information and the Operation of Markets:
Tests Based on a General Equilibrium Model of Land Leasing in India

This paper develops an estimable general equilibrium model of land leasing to test the extent to
which information is commonly held in a village and whether village markets are efficient. The results
have ramifications for the estimation of agricultural household models and for our understanding of rural
institutions. The model is derived from the primitives of the production technology, the extent of
information and the distributions of assets and several household unobservables. Simultaneity and
selection issues are dealt with explicitly in a two-stage maximum likelihold estimation procedure using
panel data from India.

Keywords: Agricultural household models, information, sharecropping, land markets, general
equilibrium.

Recent years have seen an increasing interest in incorporating correct informational assumptions
in behavioral economic models. This paper develops an estimable general equilibrium model of land
leasing in order to investigate whether information is commonly held among villagers in a rural
agricultural setting and whether village markets are complete and efficient. While these questions are
simple, the answers have some broad ramifications for the estimation of agricultural household models,
for our understanding rural institutions and, in particular, for our understanding of land contracts.
New theoretical models in the development literature have sought to explain the existence of
various community-level institutions on the basis of different assumptions about asymmetries of
information. One set of theories explains the existence of institutions on the basis of informational
asymmetries within communities. Examples include theories of permanent labour contracts; interlinkages
between markets, such as joint credit/labour contracts; and sharecropping contracts in the land market2.
By contrast, another set relies on the superiority of information within, versus outside of, communities.
For example, in the literature on formal and informal credit markets and insurance, common group
information is used as a basis for credit risk analysis, the mitigation of adverse selection and moral hazard
problems, and the enforcement of obligations'.

While the existence of institutions which appear to exploit informational advantages or to
overcome informational problems is often used to suggest that information is, or is not, widespread in
villages, to avoid circularity one would like independent evidence to support such assumptions. It is,
however, difficult to devise econometric tests. Measures of the individual characteristics or actions about
which one cares whether there is information are often unavailable or inherently unobservable: skill,
.

.

reliability, effort, and so on. One of the objectivei: of this paper is to provide evidence on this point.
The results suggest that information, in this case about the relative farming skill of farmers, is widespread
in a village environment.

The second issue addressed in the paper, whether village input markets function well, is of central

2

See, for example, Eswaran and Kotwal (1985a), Bravennan and Gausch (1984), Hoff, Braverman

and Stiglitz (1993) and the references cited therein, and the discussion of sharecropping below.
3

On group lending see Besley and Coate, 1991, and Hulme, 1990; on state-contingent lending,

Udry, 1994; on informal insurance, Platteau, 1990.
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importance to the recent modelling and estimation of agricultural household
models. (See Singh, I., et.
al., 1986 for a discussion of the econometric issues.) These models recognize
the fact that households
in agrarian settings are both producers and consumers. A crucial issue for the
estimation of these models
is whethe r household decisions regarding production can be treated as separab
le from those concerning
consumption. If markets are complete and efficient, then the models are
recursive, with production
decisions being independent of preferences and asset ownership. It follows
that production and
consumption equations need not be estimated simultaneously.
There have been few empirical tests of the proposition that rural input
markets are well
functioning. Benjamin (1992) and Pitt and Rosenzweig (1986) are two exampl
es, both of which focus
exclusively on the labour market and both of which test different implications
of market imperfections.
The first study tests whether labour demand is related to household demographic
structure. The second
tests whether household illness, which lowers family labour input, also lowers
farm profits, or whether
the fall in family labour is compensated by hired labour. The results of
both studies suggest that
separability is an appropriate assumption. This paper provides a related test of
separability based on input
markets. Here the tested implication of separability is that asset ownership should
not influence the land
leasing decisions of households. This paper extends earlier tests to the full
range of productive input
markets , including labour.

A more specific reason for being interested in the answers to the questions
considered in this
paper is that they contribute to our understanding of land contracts. The role
of di:(ferent contract forms
has generated a great deal of theoretical interest in recent years. In the context
of land leasing, this
interest has both a long history and a particular importance given efforts
by many- governments to
suppress a widespread form of leasing contract: share tenancy (see Bell,
1990; and Osmani, 1991).
Given the theoretical arguments (following Marshall, 1890) and empirical evidenc
e (e.g., Bell, 1977; and
Shaban, 1987) that sharecropping is an inefficient form of contract, its persiste
nce in large parts of the
world remains something of a puzzle.

Assumptions about the extent of information in a village and the imperfection
of input markets

3

underpin two prominent theories of share contracting4 •

The first theory is based on an assumed

asymmetry of information between landlords and prospective tenants or wage laborers about the latter's
entrepreneurial ability. Share contracts, it is argued, co-exist with other forms of contracts as a way of

screening workers by skill levels. A separating equilibrium exists with different ability workers making
different contract choices, thereby increasing landowner profits (Hallagan, 1978; Allen, 1980). The
second theory proposes that share contracts are a response to imperfect or missing input markets (Bell and
Zusman, 1976; Bliss and Stem, 1982; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985b). In this situation, land moves to the
owner of the non-marketable input(s). In particular, skill has been suggested as one input which
motivates leasing because it does not have a market independent of labor and is difficult to monitor. The
results allow one to reject the asymmetric information assumption which lies behind screening as a
rationale for multiple contracts. Villagers are aware of those whq are more skilled and lease in and out
in accordance with this information. On the other hand, the finding that several input markets are
imperfect lends support to the second explanation for sharecropping.
A number of other papers have considered the functioning of input rental markets as a
determinant of leasing behavior - for example, Bell and Sussangkarm (1988), Bliss and Stem (1982), and
Skoufias (1991). The methodology used here extends previous work in several directions. Leasing
equations are generated from the primitives of the production technology and the distribution of
information, assets and several unobservables. The non-linearities in the land cultivated equations are
modelled explicitly and both time variant and invariant errors are accommodated.
The estimations and tests presented in the paper are based on both the land leasing behavior and
the agricultural output of all farm households in the north Indian village o~ Palanpur. Agricultural
households make decisions about whether and how much land to lease, either in or out, and then they
cultivate. The test of whether input markets are imperfect hinges on whether owned inputs reflect the
inputs utilized in production and thus influence both leasing and output. With complete and efficient
rental markets, owned inputs should be poor proxies for input use and have insignificant coefficients when

4

There are many other theories and they are not mutually exclusive. One popular idea, initially
posited by Cheung (1969) and developed in Stiglitz (1974), is that share contracts allow risk sharing
between the landlord and the tenant.
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included in a production function.

(This is directly analogous to the attenuation bias arising from

mismeasurement.)

The test of the extent of information regarding the relative farming skill of households is whether
household ability, or 'skill' influences its success in obtaining land in the leasing market. Since
sharecropping contracts involve the division of output, if villagers know which households are relatively
more skilled then those households should be able to obtain more land under lease, conditional on their
other productive assets.

Implementing this test clearly requires a measure of relative household farming skill. By utilizing
panel data on both leasing decisions and output it is possible to identify three types of household
characteristics which are unobservable (at least to the econometrician). One is skill which is discussed
below. In addition, the model also allows for two unobservable household characteristics which vary
over time. The first is a stochastic shock affecting only output. The second is known to villagers at the
time of contracting and so influences both leasing and output. This is obtained by inverting the leasing
equation. While the context is very different, the use of leasing data to identify unobservables in the
production function is related to current innovations in productivity estimation, as discussed in Griliches
and Mairesse (NBER, 1995). For example, Olley and Pakes (1994) estimate a non-parametric model of
investment to back out a (single) production function unobservable.
The panel nature of the data is exploited to obtain a measure of the rel~tive farming skill of
households - associated with a time invariant unobservable characteristic which affects both leasing
behavior and output. A coefficient, 8, appears on the unobserved skill variable ·in the equation
determining the amount of land that a household can leased in. A null hypothesis of no informatio
n
corresponds a 8 of zero while a null of perfect information corresponds a 8 of one.
The fact that there is a well defined null hypothesis corresponding to perfect information is one
of the benefits of the structure put on the model. By contrast consider the somewhat analogous
methodology found in the labour literature. A measure of the individual unobservable variable 'ability'
is estimated from, for example, schooling choices. These measures typically take the form of inverse
Mill's ratios, and are given coefficients in wage equations to test for the impact of ability on earnings (for
example, Willis, 1986, and Taber, 1995). In the absence of a model of how ability affects earnings
if

5

recognized by employers, it is impossible to specify a null hypothesis which corresponds to perfect
information.

Another benefit of the structure is that it allows an explicit treatment of simultaneity and selection
issues - problems which are intractable in reduced form estimations (see section 4). Both the land
cultivated by a household and its agricultural output are functions of the unobservables. This simultaneity
is addressed with the joint estimation of land cultivated and output equations. The allocation of land for
cultivation is a function of the production technology, the degree to which villagers are informed about
each other's farming skill, the distribution of input ownership and the distribution of unobservable
characteristics, including skill. Given the amount of land owned by each household, it follows that the
tenurial status of each household - whether it is a tenant, landlord or a household which does not
participate in the leasing market - is similarly endogenously determined. This 'selection' into types is
important as it generates a non-linearity in the function relating land cultivated to assets and
unobservables, with the non-linearity arising from changes in the allocation equation across status. Thus
the leasing equation cannot be estimated using a reduced form linear approximation as seen in most
previous studies. 5

The following section of the paper provides a brief description of agriculture and other relevant
aspects of the evolving Palanpur economy which motivate the structure of the analysis which follows.
The second section outlines the model of land allocation and characterizes equilibria in the leasing market.
Section 3 sets forth the econometric structure of the model and section 4 des~ribes the two-stage
maximum likelihood procedure used in estimation. It also includes a discussion of the problems which
arise with what might appear to be simpler approaches to answering the same questions -considered here.
The final section presents estimation results and offers concluding comments.

5

The bias induced by a relationship between an discrete explanatory variable and the disturbance
tenn is often tenned a selection effect (for example, in the labour literature when a schooling dummy
is related to unmeasured ability). In this case, because the (continuous) functional relationship between
the explanatory variable land cultivated and the disturbance tenn differs by categories - tenant, landlord,
non-participant - the econometric issue-dealt with here could be thought of as a combination of selection
and simultaneity problems.
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1. The Palanpur Economy

The analysis presented in this paper is based on data from two household surveys· of Palanpur, a
village located in the district of Moradabad in western Uttar Pradesh6 • The survey years were 1974/75
and 1983/84 (henceforth 1974 and 1983). All village households were surveyed and detailed information
was collected on family structure, occupation, land ownership and cultivation, production, incomes,
assets, and related variables.

Palanpur is surrounded by open fields covering about 2,560 bighas (approximately 400 acres).
At the beginning of the 1983 survey, the village numbered 960 inhabitants, divided into 143 households.
Agriculture is the most significant component of the Palanpur economy. There are two main seasons in
the agricultural year, rabi and kharif. The data used here pertain to the production of wheat during the
rabi season.

While fixed-rent leasing does occasionally occur in Palanpur (absentee landlord, immediate need
for payment), the principal contractual arrangement is sharecropping. Although declining somewhat in
importance, in 1983 such contracts still covered 80 percent of all leasing. The standard contract (batai)
involves the equal sharing of both outputs and cash inputs between landlord and tenant, with labour being
entirely provided by the tenant. 7 In 1974, 21.0 percent of village land was under lease during the rabi
season and by 1983 it had increased to 26.4 percent. These figures tend to underplay the importance of
leasing in the village as, for example, in 1983, 74 percent of all households were party to a leasing
contract. In contrast, sales of land occur infrequently and usually as a consequence of distress.
Within the village, agriculture became more intensive over the period in the use of modem inputs
such as fertilizers, motorized irrigation devices (pumping sets) and new seed varieties. New farming

6

The 1974/75 study was conducted by Christopher Bliss, Nicholas Stem, and S.S. Tyagi (Jr.) and
the results are'reported in Bliss and Stem (1982). The 1983/84 survey was directed by the same
researchers in collaboration with Jean Dreze; the field work was carried out by Jean Dreze and Naresh
Sharma. Survey data is also available for 1957/58 and 1962/63.
7

For further details on the terms of sharecropping contracts in Palanpur, see Bliss and Stem (1982)
and Sharma and Dreze (1990).
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practices (such as double-cropping) and seeds were first introduced before 1974. Although
1983 was a
poor year for agriculture in Palanpur (due to drought, hot winds and various pest attacks),
by that point
agricultural practices had intensified still further. In 1974, for example, Persian wheels,
a traditional
form of irrigation utilizing bullock power, still made a large contribution to irrigation
(there were 22
Persian wheels and 9 diesel pumping sets) whereas in 1983 very few Persian wheels were
in active use
and there were·22 pumping sets.

Over the period Palanpur also became more closely linked to the wider economy outside
the
. village. The rapid growth of population, from 757 in 1974 to 960 in 1983, heightened pressure
on land
and increased the incentive for seeking off-farm employment.
At the same time there was an
improvement in employment opportunities outside the village, mainly in nearby towns. As
a result, the
number of regular outside jobs among households increased from 37 in 1974 to 54 in 1983.
These jobs
contributed around one third of total village income in 1983. However, while off-farm jobs
are attractive
to villagers in Palanpur because of the comparatively high and stable incomes they generate
, such jobs
are not readily available and access appears limited by family and caste connections.
Input Markets

Consideration of the input markets in Palanpur suggests many reasons to expect that they
might
not operate smoothly.

The most common form of labour contract in Palanpur is casual agricultural wage labour.

A striking

feature of the labour market is that many households with excess labour will not hire it out
on the market
because working for another household is regarded as demeaning. Dreze, Lanjouw and Stem
(1992) find
that households involved in agricultural labour are highly represented among the long-term
poor. They
suggest that this is a selection rather than a wage effect - only households already in distress
chose to
undertake such labour. For some of the higher caste households, working for a lower caste
household
is so distasteful that it is not really an option at all. In 1983, only 25 villagers were regularly
available
for agricultural labour (Dreze and Mukherjee, 1989). Women, in particular, very rarely engage
in wage
labour. For them to work alongside male family members in the fields is only slightly more
common.
As a result, for most households (male) family labour is likely to represent a fixed amount
of agricultural
labour available to the household. Even where laborers are hired, family size is a relevant
constraint on

8.

the total labour available to a household as hired labour is invariably supervised.
Non-labour inputs can, in principle, be purchased or their services rented. The hiring of bullock
services is rare. This is discussed in Bliss and Stem (1982) where they _point out disadvan
tages to both
sides of a possible transaction in bullock services. Because bullocks are valuable animals, bullock
owners
work with them as they are reluctant to entrust hirers with care of the animals. The provisio
n of labour
services to the hirer in this way may be unattractive to a bullock owner if he is from one
of the higher
castes, particularly as his work effort may be supervised. From the hirers' point of view,
the fact that
the owner comes with the bullocks may be a disadvantage if the household already has plenty
of labour.
Furthermore, there is an issue of timing - the demands for draught power in a village often
coincide and
a farmer wishing to hire services may find no bullocks available. Although irrigation services
(Persian
wheels, pumping sets) may also be subject to this last consideration, there is an active rental
market.
As an alternative to rental, the purchase and sale of inputs to adjust to the amount of
land
available for cultivation may not be possible (or desirable) in the short run and may be limited
even in
the longer run. Because there is considerable turnover (Sharma and Dreze, 1990) tenants
do not have
even implicit long-term contracts on parcels of land. Purchasing durable inputs to use on land
leased for
one season is likely to require their sale at the end of the season. In addition, some inputs are
inherently
lumpy. Bullocks, for instance, not only provide power for a large area relative to
the average
landholding in Palanpur, but are also invariably used in pairs. Animals and machinery alike
are prone
to die or break down, introducing a risk element to ownership which may ,constrai
n purchases,
particularly for poorer households.

The financial resources required to invest in agricultural assets are not trivial, so credit constrain
ts
may also limit access to such assets through purchase. The credit market in Palanpur can
be broadly
divided into four segments: interest free credit from friends and relatives, low interest credit
from state
institutions (including rural banks and a local Credit Cooperative), commercial credit
from urban
goldsmiths and pawn-brokers, and high interest credit from village moneylenders (see Dreze,
Lanjouw
and Sharma, 1993). Nominal interest rates vary widely between these four sources (from zero
in the case
of friends and relatives to about sixty per cent per year in the case of village moneylenders),
but non
price factors limit arbitrage. The riskiness and expense of taking out large loans, and rationing
in the
supply of credit, constrains the purchase of complementary assets (see Kochar, 1992).

9

2. The Leasing Model

This section presents a model of land leasing based on the optimizing behavior of households.
Farmers are assumed to maximize expected net agricultural income, and in pursuing this goal they may
decide to be either landlords (LL), tenants (T), or they may choose not to participate in the land leasing
market (0). Note that throughout the paper a landlord is defined as someone net leasing out and vice
versa for a tenant. 8 The return from cultivation differs across these choices. In order to determine the
optimal decision for each household, this section first derives value functions for each choice of tenurial
status, denoted VLL, VT, and V0• These specify the return that-a farmer expects to receive from his own
cultivation and cropshares on leased land, conditional on his owned assets and unobservable
characteristics. The second part of the section discusses the leasing market equilibria, both uniqueness
.a..'ld existence.

The following model is developed in terms of a general production function. Equations for the
specific functional form used in estimation are in the following section. Let

(1)

represent- the net output when I\ bighas of land are cultivated py household i with a vector of purchased
inputs,~. and a vector of owned assets, A;. fl; is a vector of error terms, .>. a vector of parameters, and

Pk! a vector of marketed input prices9 • Maximizing over ~. let

(2)

8

Farmers may, and do, lease in and lease out land concurrently. They may wish to consolidate their
cultivated area if, with the division among family members of land owned, their holdings have become
scattered.

Alternatively, they may wish to reduce risk of crop loss by spreading out their plots.

However, both of these considerations affect the geographical composition of land cultivated while we
are interested here in adjustments to the amount of land cultivated.
9

Without a market, the implicit price of owned assets is assumed to be zero, although it is
recognized that bullocks and people need more food when working and there is some level of disutility
from labor.

10
represent the .net output when l1j bighas of land are cultivated with optimal levels of any marketed inputs.
It is assumed that

[Al] g(0;.)

= 0; g( h;.) is twice differentiable and strictly concave in h, and that the land cultivated by

a household, owned and under lease, can be aggregated in the production function.
The first restrictions on the production function are standard. The last, which implies that inputs
are allocated by households across their cultivated land without regard to ownership, is not a general
feature of agricultural production. For example, Bell (1977), Hossain (1977) and Shaban (1987) find
lower productivity on tenanted land than on owned land in other parts of South Asia. However, this
assumption could not be rejected for Palanpur in statistical tests reported elsewhere (Bliss and Stem, .
1982). IO

Consider first a household which cultivates an area h. Because output must be shared on leased
land, the total agricultural profit the household receives depends on the relation between h and the land
owned by the household, LO - that is whether h

> LO (tenant), h = LO (non-participant), or h < LO

(landlord). Below we define the profit that a household would receive given each choice. However, the
optimal choice over tenurial status must be made from those which are actually available to the
household. Not participating is, of course, always an option. A sufficient condition for leasing out to
be an option is that there be at least one landless villager not otherwise employed. On the other hand,
as we shall see, leasing in land may or may not be possible for a given househpld depending on its
characteristics.

Value Functions

For any household, agricultural profits under each type of tenurial status may be defined as
follows:

10

In fact Bliss and Stern find that, controlling for both crop and household, yields on tenanted land
are actually higher than on owned land (although with a small sample size the difference is not
statistically significant).
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Landlord: The expected 11 net agricultural profit of a landlord household is

?!"LL(

h; C, LO, A,

o, .>., pJ = g(h; .) + C (LO - h),

(3)

where C is the expected, per bigha, value of leasing out, a value which is defined implicitly below 12•
Although C is determined endogenously by the demand and supply of land, it is treated parametrically
by landlords. That is, landlords are assumed to ignore the negative impact of an additional bigha of
leasing on the village equilibrium average product on tenanted land (and hence on their return on land
already leased). It would, in any case, be only a second order effect given the amount of land (owned
or leased) under cultivation by tenants in Palanpur. C replaces the vectors of assets and unobservables
of all other households which would otherwise enter the profit function of household i. It summarizes
all of the market information relevant to household i's optimization problem. Landlords retain an amount
of land, h, and lease out (LO - h), choosing h so as to maximize their profits. This implies that they
cultivate until the expected net product that they receive from own cultivation of the marginal bigha is
equal to the expected return from leasing 13 :

g'(h;.)

= C.

(4)

11

For expositional simplicity the expectations operator has been suppressed. E::'pectations are taken
with respect to the relevant agent - which is an important consideration as information may differ
across agents. It should be understood that outputs are in expectation at the time of contracting and the
stochastic shocks are independent of tenurial status. Household subscripts have also been suppressed.
12

It is assumed that there is nothing advantageous in specific tenant/landlord pairings. In other
words, C is common to all agents. The fact that pairings change over years supports this assumption,

although there are more within caste pairings than would be suggested by random sorting.
13

Individual random deviations from optimizing behavior are accommodated in the empirical
estimation. See the discussion in section 3 under error E.
Transactions costs would put a floor on the minimum transaction size. It is assumed that in
Palanpur such costs are low, an ·assumption which is supported by the fact that parcels as small as one
half of a bigha are leased. For an estimation of leasing costs in other parts oflndia see Skoufias (1995).

12
=> (using [Al] to ensure invertability)

hu. = min{ (g')" 1(C),

LO}.

(5)

Let

(6)

be the maximized expected return to a household if it decides to be a landlord household. If g'(LO; .) >
C
then the household does not gain from leasing out any of its land and VLL = V (defined below).
0
Non-Participant:

By definition, for non-participants h

=

LO so their expected return equals their

expected net agricultural profit:

V0( C, LO, A, 0, A, Pk)

= 1r0(LO;

.)

= g(LO;

.).

(7)

Tenant: Under the 50/50 sharecropping contract,

1ri h;

C, LO, A, O, A, pJ

= g(h;.)[1/2 +

1/2(LO/h)].

(8)

The 50/50 sharing rule of the batai contract is imposed here (see section 1). There are a few dimension
s
in which bargaining over the distribution of returns may occur, such as the amount of animal manure that
a tenant must provide per bigha or the extent of low cost credit for the purchase of jnputs to be provided
by one of the parties. They are not extensive, however. Multiple interlinkages between parties are not
commonly observed in Palanpur and tenant/landlord relationships are typically shortlived which limits
the ability to move away from the explicit 50/50 share "price" in response to demand and supply factors.
Of course, it is impossible to prove the absence of side payments. The sharing rule assumption is not
trivial as it is necessary for identification of the model.

It is assumed here, and shown in section 3 for the production function used in the empirical
analysis, that

[A2]

13
The reason for making this assumption is that it implies that if a farmer leases in any land at all then he
would like to lease in as much land as possible. This allows us to consider only the landlord's decision
rule when determining the allocation of land across tenants14 • Given this assumption and [Al], it is
easily argued that optimal decisions by landlords imply a distribution of leased land which equates across
tenants the expected amount (C) paid per bigha. That is, the expected average product of tenants is
equated, and with the 50/50 cropshare,

l/2[g(h)/hL = C

i = l, .. t,

(9)

where tis the number of tenants. This equation implicitly defines hT, the maximum amount of land that
the household can obtain (for hT:.::: LO). Again, by [A2], if the household is a tenant household,

hr will

be accepted and thus can be used to define

(10)
If a household would like to lease in but cannot do so (hr

<

LO), that is, a household for which

1/2[g(LO)/LO] < C,

(11)

then VT = V0 • It is also possible, since d11""Tfdh < 0 has not been ruled out, that a household may be
able to lease in, but not desire to lease in (hr < h'). This possibility is addressed in.the following section
in the context of the more specific model used in estimation.

Figures la and 1b show the net leasing position of a single household as a function of the implicit
price C, given that tenurial status is chosen optimally. When C is high, the household leases out land
and his determined by the landlord equation g'(h;.) = C. When C is low, the household is able to lease

14

It may not be immediately clear why a household may not be willing to lease in small amounts
of land (i.e., why h* may be greater than LO). The reason is that when a farmer leases in a bigha of
land it has a negative impact on the average product on all of his cultivated land because his fixed
inputs are diverted to the new land. This 'cost' of leasing is borne entirely by the tenant for the first
bigha leased. As the ratio of owned to leased land falls, more of this cost is shared by landlords.

14
in land and his determined by the tenant equation (1/2)[g(h;.)/h] = C. There may exist
a range of C
where the household does not participate in the leasing market. It is also possible for the
function h(C)
to be discontinuous as in figure lb, a case discussed below.
Equilibria

There are two possible equilibria in the land leasing market and they are characterized by
the
following conditions:

For£ landlords:

VLLi
and

Fort tenants:

g'(hw)

= C,

i

= 1, ... £.

i

=

l, ... t.

i

=

l, ... ,n.

Vn
and

For n non-participants:

£ +t+n
E hi

=

= the number of cultivating households and,

the total amount of agricultural land (feasibility).

The aggregate net demand for leased land at each implicit price C is simply the horizona
l sum
of the individual net demands [E(h;-LOJ]. Two possible leasing market equilibria, exist.
The first has
£ + t = 0, that is, all households choose not to participate in the leasing market and
all are on the
vertical segment of their net leasing functions (figure la). In this equilibrium, the implicit
price C which
'clears' the market may not be unique. Non-uniqueness would be a problem since C is a paramete
r to be
estimated. However, this equilibrium is ruled out if there is one landless household.
(Given [Al],
[g(h;.)/h]

ash-+ 0 so landless households are always able and willing to take land under lease.)
There are landless households in Palanpur and this equilibrium is not empirically relevant.
-+ oo

The second equilibrium involves leasing(£ + t > 0) and it is straightforward to show that
in this
equilibrium C is unique. When household net leasing functions are continuous, as depicted
in figure la,
this property translates to the aggregate net leasing function. With at least two households
are leasing,
and hence off the vertical segment of their net leasing curves, the aggregate net leasing function
is also

15
monotonically decreasing in C. As C increases, the amount of land that all households desire to retain
for cultivation, assuming that they can find tenants at C, goes to zero ( E(h; - LO)-+ -H as C-+ oo ).
As C falls the amount of land that households would be able to obtain under lease, assuming a perfectly
elastic supply at C, goes to infinity ( E~ - LO;) -+ oo as C -+ 0 ). Together with continuity and
monotonicity these limits ensure that aggregate net leasing is zero at a single value of C

>

0.

Finally, as shown in figure lb, there can be a discontinuity in the household net leasing function
which rules out non-participation. This arises only with imperfect information and only over a restricted
portion of the distribution of the unobservables (a formal discussion is in the appendix under 'scenario
two'). If this situation arises then equilibrium may not exist15 • It is assumed that equilibrium exists and the finding of perfect information is consistent with this assumption.

3. Econometric Specification

This section uses the characteristics of equilibrium from the previous section to derive estimating
equations for a specific production function. The production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas
in labour, land, and marketed inputs. Other inputs, such as draught power and irrigation devices, and
the unobservable factors enter production as shift parameters. The inputs are treated differently because
land, labour (and seeds) suffice to produce a non-zero quantity of output, whereas land or labour alone
do not. Let

(13)

where

represent the conditional production function for household i in year t, conditional on the application of
optimal levels of marketed inputs. This corresponds to the function g{h,k;.) in the previous section. In
the absence of information about intra-village variation in input prices, an independent effect of marketed

15

Clearly some allocation of land does happen. Existence refers to whether the rules derived from
the model fully describe the resulting allocation.
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inputs is not identifiable and is subsumed in lYo· Differences in marketed input use due to household-level
price variation will end up in the error terms Si or 1/it (see below).

For the production function specified both assumptions [Al] and [A2] apply:
[Al]

The first assumption holds provided 'Y < 1 and L > 0 for all cultivating households.

[A2]

For the production function specified,

d'll'idh

Thus d'l!'T/dh

~

0 for all h

that whenever 2-y > 1, h*

~

= [g(h;.)/2h]

[ 'Y - (1--y)(LO/h)].

(14)

(1--y)LO/-y, and [A2] is satisfied. Notice from the first derivative of 'll'T

= LO.

That is, if this parameter relationship holds, and if a household is

willing to lease in at all, it will be willing to lease in any amount of land available to it regardless of how
small.

Variables

See Table 1 for descriptive statistics.

Output (y)

Output is gross annual output of rabi season wheat measured in 1,000 1Q74 rupees (as are all
monetary values).

La,nd cultivated (h)
Measured in units of 10 bighas

=

1.56 acres.

Some households may have income earning

opportunities outside of cultivation leading them to lease out all of their land. This type of leasing
behavior is not an adjustment of land to agricultural assets, the phenomenon that the model is designed
to capture. Since selection into outside jobs does not appear to be based on characteristics associated with
farm productivity, such households are simply dropped from the data (see section 1).

La,bor (L)
Labor is a composite indicator including all adult male members of the household between the
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ages of 16 and 60 who do not have a job outside of agriculture. It also includes boys of age 10-15 plus
adult women with an independent parameter, w. indicating their value as laborers relative to an adult
male. Given the social constraints in the village on women working outside of the home one expects this
parameter to be substantially less than one.

Bullock power (VJ
Bullock power is measured by the total value of livestock owned by the household. Ideally one
would like a seasonal flow rather than a stock variable for draught power. Since a bullock's value reflects
discounted future flows, V will overstate the seasonal flow of service more for young animals than for
old animals and will be a noisy proxy as a result.

Irrigation devices (PW, PS)
PW and PS are 0/1 dummy variables indicating whether or not the household owned a Persian
wheel or a diesel pumping set respectively.

Error Structure - 0

= {S,

'1/, e}

Error S - 'Ski.ll'
This component of the error vector captures unobservable heterogeneity in the cultivation skill
of households - that is, differences in aptitude, experience, and commitment. This component is
measured by the within-household covariance in disturbances.
As part of a residual, 'skill' includes any mismeasurement in relevant variables, both included
or omitted, which is constant over time. For instance, differential access to borrowed or rented inputs
(e.g., a brother's bullock) could creep into this skill measure, although it seems unlikely that a household
would be able to maintain a privileged position in this respect over a decade. A more plausible possibility
is that 'skilled' dynasties happen to own land of particularly good quality. As land sales in Palanpur are
rare, the land owned by a dynasty does remain relatively unchanged over time. However, land quality
indicators were found insignificant in research using the 1974 data. This may simply be a result of the
rather crude nature of the land quality indicators, hut it nevertheless suggests that quality does not affect
output markedly. As noted above, because of a lack of data, households are assumed to face the same
prices for marketed inputs. If, in fact, some households face lower prices then, all else equal, they will
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apply more inputs and appear more productive. Finally, wealth might be thought to influence agricultural
productivity indirectly through its effect on the labor/leisure choices of farmers. The measure of labour
is numbers of bodies rather than person/hours. To the extent that more wealth lowers the amount of farm
labour represented by each person, a wealthier household will appear less productive than a poorer
household. Thus 'skill' as measured here incorporates effort.

The 'skill' component of the disturbance vector is known to the household but may or may not
be known to other households in the village - a question that we test in the empirical estimation below.
Error 11
11 is that component of the disturbance vector which is independent across households and time

· and known to all agents at the time of contracting. It incorporates any time variant mismeasurement
in
variables, in particular due to the use of proxy variables such as bullock stocks versus flows for draught
power and numbers of people versus hours for labour. It also includes any discrepancy between inputs
used and inputs owned due to rental.

Error e

e is that component of the disturbance which is independent across time and is not known to
anyone at the time of contracting. This unanticipated stochastic shock to production would include, for
example, weather and pest attacks, and is likely to be correlated across households in a given year.
Any stochastic element which affects leasing but not output, for example, individual deviations
from optimal leasing decisions, simply entails a redefinition of 11 and e. Allowing for- such deviations
,
say o, the composite disturbance in the leasing equations would be S + (11+0), and that in the output
equation would be S + (11+0) + (e-o).

Distribution of 0:
0

~ N ( -diag[E]/2 , .t )

where O is the stacked vector of error terms for all households and all years. 0 is assumed to be
independent of the vector of land owned, LO, and the (now matrix) of owned inputs, A. The mean of
0, denoted µ,, is specified as (-diag[E]/2) in order that the mean of exp{O}

=

1.

While it seems
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appropriate that, in expectation, the disturbances should not affect output, this is largely for convenience
in the following equations. It is not a substantive assumption as differences between the true mean and
.that specified only affect the estimated value of ao, the production function constant.
The variance of the components of the disturbance vector are assumed equal across households
and they are denoted oi, o-,,2 and o.2. Off diagonal elements of E include a within dynasty covariance
(due to S) and a within time covariance (due to e). All other off diagonal elements are zero. The first
covariance is dealt with directly in the estimation by modelling S as a dynasty random effect. The second
is not incorporated directly. It is, however, potentially important as it entails a divergence between the
expected value of exp{e} (= 1), which effects the estimate of ao via equations relating to the amount of
land leased, and the sample mean of exp{e} (~ 1), which effects the estimate of ao via the output
equation. This inconsistency could introduc~ biases into estimates of the other parameters. To avoid this
problem, survey information is used to provide an estimate of the average ratio between output realized
at the end of the harvest and that predicted at the beginning of the season. For 1974 this ratio is
estimated as 1.15 and for 1983, a year of poor harvests, as 0.65 (see Table 1). This ratio is used to
adjust realized output (down in 1974, up in 1983) so that the sample mean of exp{e} equals one as
assumed.

Land allocation equations

Given the production function above and the equilibrium conditions in section 2, we can specify
the amount of l~d that a household would cultivate under each tenurial status, conditional on LO, A, the
parameter vector>. and different values of the unobservables, (S,-17):

Landlord :

bu = min{

[-yl! exp{X't/t

+ S + 17} 1q 11c1-,,>, LO}.

(15)

Again equations are in expectation with respect to the relevant agent and i,j,t subscripts have been
suppressed.

Tenant:

hr=

max{ [I! exp{X't/t

+ OS + 17} 12q 11c1-,,>, LO}.

(16)

The parameter O captures the possibility that landlords do not have perfect information about the skill
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level of households and therefore may not take skill into account in allocating land to tenants.

Non-participant: Of course, by definition,

ho = LO.

These equations for land cultivated may be used in the value functions defined in the previous
section to obtain:

= [LO-YUexp{X'if, + S + 17}],

(17)

= C [ LO + (1--y)J,y)[-yUexp{X'if, + S + 17}/C] 11<1--Y>],

(18)

V0

VLL

VT

= C exp{(l-0)S}

[ LO

+

(Uexp{X'if,

+

OS

+ 11} /2C) 110"'Y>].

(19)

V 0 is simply the expected net return to cultivating land owned. VLL is the return that the household would

expect from leasing out all of its land, C*LO, (where C is equal to its marginal product in equilibrium),
plus the difference between its marginal product and the average product it expects to obtain on the land
it retains. VT is the amount of land cultivated by the tenant plus LO, the term in D, times one half of the
average product on that land expected by landlords (C in equilibrium) adjusted by the difference between
the landlords' expectations and the tenant's expectations. If S

= 0 or if landlords are perfectly informed

(0= 1) then their expectations coincide and this tenn falls out.

4. The Estimation Procedure

The model is estimated using maximum likelihood. The contribution to the likelihood function
for a given dynasty is the joint probability of observing its actual combination of land cultivated and
output levels in each year, conditioning on its land owned and assets. For any observed leasing choice
there are some combinations of the unobservables (11, S) which are inconsistent with that choice. This
is discussed at length in the appendix where it is also shown that the likelihood does not have an explicit
form unless 2-y > 1. Assuming that this parameter restriction holds, the contribution to the likelihood
function of a given household is:
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(20)

where

¢0 is the standard normal density function and the subscripts LL, T, 0 beneath the product

operators indicate contributions to the likelihood in years when a household has the tenurial status
landlord, tenant or non-participant, respectively. The integrand 11' represents the maximum value of 11 for
a household to lease out, defined by setting hii.

11'

= LO:

= ln [ LO(I--Y>C /,1Uexp{X'if, + S}].

(21)

Similarly, 11 * represents the minimum value of 11 necessary for a household to lease in land, defined by
setting hT

= LO:

.,,· = ln [ 2Lo<1--Y>c I Uexp{X'ij, + OS}].

(22)

The probabilities are 16 :

Landlords:

¢(11)

=0

for S<O, O< 1 and 11>11x; or S>O, 0> 1 and 11>11X,

= ¢[{ (l-,1)ln(h) - {3ln(L) - X'if, - S + ln(Cf,y) - µ,,

}/

q,,]

16

else.

Tix is the value of TJ where there is a discontinuity in the land cultivated equation in cases where
a discontinuity occurs as ·depicted in figure lb. See the appendix for details.

TJx

= (1-y) [

In{ LO [exp{(l-0)S} - 1] }

- In{ [(1-y)/y][yL'3exp{X'\j/ + S}/C] 11<1·r> - [exp{(l-0)S}][L 13exp{X'\j/ + 0S}/2C]"{l-rl} ).
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Tenants:

<j,(e)

= <j,[{ln(y) - ln(h) - (1-0)S - ln(2C) - µ,,}/

u,]

for S < 0, 0 < 1 and 11 < 1,X ; or S > 0, 0 > 1 and 11 < 71X,

= <j,[{ (1--y)ln(h) - (31n(L) - X'i/; - OS + ln(2C) - µ,q }/ uq]

N~n-Participants:

<j,(e)

else.

= </>[{ ln(y) - [-yln(h) + Pln(L) + X'i/; + S + 11] - µ,, }/ u,]

For all households:

For any observed leasing behavior there are some levels of S which are inconsistent with that
behavior. In the case of non-participation this is dealt with by explicitly bounding S so as to remain in
a region with a strictly positive probability of non-participation. The bound is Sb = [ ln(l/2-y) ]/ (1-0).
If O < 1 Sb is a minimum and if O > 1 it is a maximum. As O --+ 1, Sb --+ +/- ex,. If a household is
active in the leasing market in all surveyed years, S is integrated over the range (-oo, oo) with
inconsistent events given probability zero via <j,(71). Details are in the appendix.
The parameters of the model were estimated using data on 76 households which cultivated in both
years as well as a smaller set of data on households which cultivated in a single year (19 in 1974 and 10
in 1983). The households surveyed in a single year do not, of course, contribute to the estimation of the
parameters related to skill, us and 0, directly but they are included to improve the efficiency of the other
estimates.

A problem arises if one attempts to estimate the model as specified above directly. The problem
lies in the probability </>(11) for tenants. The numerator of the equation for 11 contains the term [ln(2C) -

aol

(recall that a 0 is part of X'i/;). Only the parameter C, and not a , appears in the probability <j,(e).
0
By setting ao equal to the ln(2C) which maximizes the probability </>(e) and setting all other coefficients
to zero, one can ensure that 11 is exactly zero, and thus <j,('q) positive, regardless of the value of uq. At
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this point the likelihood -

as aq - 0 so the global maximum-likelihood estim
ator is inconsistent. (An
analogous situation arises in the switching regre
ssion model. See Quandt and Ramsey, 1978.)
00

However, there is a consistent local maximum likeli
hood estim

ator in the interior of the parameter
space which can be found in this case by estimating
the parameters in two stages. In the first stage t'1e
likelihood of observing the sample output levels
is maximized with respect to a subset of the param
eter
vector, A1 = {,, a5 , a,, 8, C}. In the second
stage, the full likelihood function is maximized
with
respect to the remaining parameters, Az = {,8,
w, ao, a 1, a 2 , a 3 , aq}, conditional on the param
eter
estimates obtained in the first stage, ~ . (For a
proo
f of the equivalence of the limit distributions found
1
by maximizing the likelihood in one and two stage
s see Amemiya, 1985, 4.2.5 .)
The model was estimated using a combination
of hill climbing and quasi-Newton search
algorithms with numerical forward difference grad
ients. Integrals with respect to 11 and S were estim
ated
by numerical quadrature with an eight node appr
oximation 17 • Using the two-stage procedure descr
ibed
above, the search algorithm converged to the same
location from a wide range of starting values. !-To
bounds were imposed on the parameters. Starting
values were chosen with 2, < 1 and this was r.eve
r
breached during estimation.

Alternative Esti.mati.on Approaches
Given the rather complex nature of this modellin
g and estimation approach it might be asked
whether there are simpler, but still reasonable,
alternative approaches. One possible alternative
would
be to estimate a household fixed effects model using
those observations with output data for both years
to get a measure of S for each household. Then
using data on tenants alone one could estimate
an
equation for land cultivated, with 8 the coefficien
t on the household fixed effect. However, mult
iple
problems arise. First, and most obviously, it is
explicit in this approach (as in all those discussed
here)
that land cultivated is related to both other obse
rved inputs and to components of the disturbanc
e term
in the output equation. Thus coefficient estimates
would be biased and inconsistent. In fact, looki
ng at
17

No appreciable changes in the location of conv
ergence were found with finer degrees of
approximation.
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the probability component <f,(e) for landlord
s one can see that land cultivated completely
encapsulates S
and estimated fixed effects would be zero . In
the absence of suitable instruments for land culti
vated this
prob lem is insurmountable. Furt her, land
cultivated equations vary acro ss tenurial statu
s and any
subsetting of the data in this dimension gene
rates sample selection biases as tenurial statu
s is, itself, a
function of unobservable household character
istics. This could be deal t by modelling
the selection
process but then one is approaching the spiri
t of the model used here. Fina lly, a fixed effec
ts approach
entails a large drop in the degrees of fi:eedom
.
A second approach, treating skill as a rand
om effect, could be implemented by estimating
an
output equation using data for tenants only and
decomposing the variance of the residuals. That
part due
to a within household component wou ld be
an estimate of ul, the variance of skill level
s among tenant
households. (This differs from u because tenu
rial status is not independent of S.) Then
5
one could
estimate a land cultivated equation and perf orm
a similar decomposition to obta in an estimate
of fPu/ (see
the probability <f,('q) for tenants above). An
estimate of 8 follows from a com pari son of
these two. All
of the problems noted above arise with this
approach including a loss of efficiency whic
h is here due to
utilizing only data on tenant households.

5. Results and Concluding Comments
Before turning to the estimation results, two
points of interpretation shou ld.be noted. Firs
t, any
mismeasurement in owned assets biases coef
ficient estimates towards zero and coul d lead
to a failure to
reject separability. This is most likely to be
an issue with respect to bullocks which are
measured in .
terms of stoc k value rather than serv ice flow
. Second, if ownership of an asset is endogene
ous, and in
particular related to a household's skill leve
l, the coefficient on that asset will be have
a positive bias.
This could lead to a rejection of separability,
that is, ownership might be found to be corre
lated with
output, but the interpretation wou ld be inco
rrect. Again, this concern is mos t relevant
to bullocks. In
the absence of other variables to use as instr
uments this problem is unavoidable, how ever
the discussion
in section one would suggest that the adjustme
nt of durable assets via purchase/sales is unlik
ely to be a
majo r concern.

The estimation results are presented in Tabl
e 2.

The first two columns contain estimated
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parameter values and standard errors for a general versio
n of the model allowing for differences across
the years in most of the production function coefficients
, as well as the variances of the unobservables.
In the third and fourth columns are estimates for a restri
cted version of the model which constrains the
production function to be the same across periods, sets a~,
= a~, and w = a 2 = a 3 = 0. The restricted
version can be rejected at a > .01 (x2(8) = 19.15).
The standard errors of the parameter estimates, a(.~), are
estimated with a design matrix bootstrap
procedure. · The data were randomly resampled, the mode
l re-estimated using each new sample, with
standard errors then calculated from the resulting set of
estimated parameter vectors. The parameter
estimates presented in Table 2 are the mean of the resam
ple estimates.
Turni ng first to the coefficients on observed inputs, we
find that both the family labour supply
and bullo ck ownership have a significant impact on house
hold production. This result supports the
contention that imperfections in input markets motivate
land leasing and help to explain the pattern of
leasing across households. It also has the important impli
cation that farm household production and
consumption decisions are not separable and must be mode
lled and estimated talcing into account their
simultaneity.

If one makes the rather extreme assumption that input marke
ts are completely imperfect, so that
owned inputs equal utilized inputs (no mismeasuremen
t), then these estimates can be interpreted as
production function coefficients. While the coefficient
on labour, /3, was constant. over the period, that
on land, -y, increased. As a result, returns to scale appea
r to have increased over the period with ~ +
7
-y7 = .74 in 1974 and {3 +a= .92 in 1983. Statistically, however,
constant returns to scale cannot be
rejected in either perio d. (The t-statistic for -y+/3 = 1
is .753 for 1974 and .175 for 1983.)
The importance of bullock ownership appears to have
declined over time, although not
significantly. One explanation for this would be that the
rental market improved over the period thus
making ownership a less important determinant of the level
of household cultivation. On the other hand,
if the bullo ck rental mark et has not improved in efficiency
then changes in & 1 would reflect changes in
the produ ction function parameter. The decline iTl & is
likely to reflect a change in the technology of
1
production, with diesel engines providing an alternative
source of power.
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The parame ter measuring the contribution to househ old product ion of women
and boys relative
to men, w, has a point estimate of .107. This is as predict ed given the
restrictions on female labour
outside of the home in Palanpur.

The coefficients on the dummy variables for both forms of irrigatio n are insignif
icant. Ownership
of a Persian wheel or pumping set does not appear to be an importa nt contrib
utor to household production
indicating, again as expected, that the rental markets for irrigati on devices
are less imperfect than are
those for l.rbour and bullock power.

All of the components of the disturbance vector are signific ant and precisely
estimated. There
was a substan tially higher variance in the unanticipated produc tion shock,
e, in 1983 as. compared to
1974. As noted in section one, overall the harvest in 1983 was poor. The
result here suggests that the
events leading to this low harvest had an idiosyncratic impact on cultivat
ors. This could be for two
reasons. Some causes of a low yield, such as pest attacks , may be localize
d in effect. In addition,
farmers may vary in their ability to deal effectively with a commo n problem
, such as drought.
The relative ly small estimated variance in 77 would tend to support the claim
that input markets
are imperfect. The disturbance component 77 captures discrep ancies between
owned and utilized inputs
which would be large if rental markets are active. While a small variance
for this component could be
due to househ olds actively renting inputs if they were doing so to the same
extent, a more plausible
interpre tation is that owned assets are a good measure of utilized inputs for
most .bouseholds.
Variati on across households in farming ability, measur ed by o- , is an importa
nt component of the
5
unexpla ined variatio n across households in levels ofprod uctivity . That is, control
ling for input ownership
and allowin g for (time variant) factors which are both observa ble, 77, and
unobservable, e, to villagers,
there remains a substan tial degree of variation in the produc tivity of differen
t cultivating households. A
househ old with a skill level which is one standar d deviatio n higher than
the mean is 23 percent more
product ive than a househ old with the mean level of skill.
The estimat ed values of 8, 1.01 and 1.07, indicate that informa tion as to which
households are
more or less produc tive is information which is widely known in the village.
Orie can easily reject the
null hypothe sis that 8 = 0 (no information). One cannot reject the null hypothe
sis that 8 = I (perfect
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information) in the unrestricted versi on of the
model. In the restricted version, (?Ile can rejec
t perfe :t
information, but this not because villagers are unin
formed but rather that they tend to overestimate
skill
differences slightly.

The finding that information about the farming
skill of villagers is well-known lends supi;:ort to
theories which explain community-level institution
s on the basis of common group information. Ac
the
same ti.me, it casts doubt on the empirical relev
ance of those theories which are premised on
the
assumption rhat villagers are uninformed about
important (unobservable) characteristics of their
fellows.
Explaining institutions such as sharecropping or
interlinkages by-reference to their virtues in amel
iorating
adverse selection problems or to prom oting scree
ning through self-selection, does not seem credi
ble in
this context.
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Tabl e 1
Desc ripth re Stati stics
Vari able s

1974/75

1983/84

Real Value of Gross Agricultural Output
(1,000 1974 Rs)
-me an
- st. ·dev.

5.66
4.29

3.68
4.52

Land Cultivated
(10 bighas)
- mean
- st. dev

2.63
1.58

2.86
2.29

Adult Males
-me an
- st. dev

1.54
0.76

1.71
1.40

Real Value of Draught Animals
(1,000 1974 Rs)
-me an
- st. dev

0.81
0.64

0.77
0.74

Pumpset Dummy
- mean
- st. dev

0.07
0.26

0.27
0.45

Persian Wheel Dummy
-me an
- st. dev

0.22
0.42

0.23
0.42

95

86

Wheat yields, actual kg. per bigha .

114

97

Wheat yields, normal' kg. per bigha

100

150-160

Price Index2

100

140

Number of cultivating households
in data for given year

Notes:
1. "Normal" yields correspond to farmers' expressed
expected yields in advance of the year 's harvest.
2. The consumer price index for agricultural labo
urers (CPIAL) from the Bulletin of Food Statistics
.
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Table 2
Ma'(llllum Likelihood Parameter Estimates
Parameters

Estimate1

Standard Erro r

Estimate

Standard Erro r

'Y (land)
-y7 .

0. 7950_573··

0.097
0.037

0.622 ··

0.033

{3 (labour)•
{37

0.13 00.125··

0.055
0.087

0.010··

0.020

w (women/boys)

0.107

0.126

a:0 (constant)
a:o7

-0.68 7-0.600··

0.099
0.085

-0.575

0.059

a: 1 (bullocks)
0:17

0.166--

0.046
0.051

0.154·•

0.037

0.050

0.044

. 0.012

0.074

Observed Inputs:

0:2

(persian wheel)

0:3

(pump set)

o.o8r·

Errors

u5 (skill)

0.208··

0.008

0.206·"

0.001

uq (observed)
uq7

0.110··
0.155··

0.073
0.064

0.163 ••

0.025

u, (unobserved)
u,7

o.ss1 ··
0.281 ••

0.063
0.027

0.536**

0.068

Other:
(information)

1.011··

0.066

1.070**

0.020

C (equilibrium value)
C7

0.294··
0.25 4-

0.028
0.009

0.26 30.26 r-·

0.021
0.009

Log-Likelihood I
Log-Likelihood II

-128.22
-107.85

()

-137 .50
-117.42

Notes:
1-2.
Design matr ix bootstrapped standard error estimates
based on random resamples from the sample
data (35 replications). Parameter estimates are mean
s of the estimates derived from the resamples. indicates significance at a: = 0.01.
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Appe ndix
In order to specify the likelihood funct ion it is necessary
to consider the implications of various
combinations of the two unobservables (TJ, S) which influe
nce tenurial status - some combinations are
inconsistent with some leasing choices. There are three
possible scenarios. These are show n in fig,.!re
2, which shows levels of the value functions VLL, VT, and
V0 for different levels of the unobservable 77,
holding constant C, LO, A and S. (The figure also highli
ghts the problem of selection bias which arises
if tenurial status is not treated as endogenous.)
Let TJ' repre sent the maximum value of 11 at which a
household just leases out if it decides to be a
landl ord household, i.e. 71' is defined by settin g hi.r. =
LO:

77'

= In [ LOc1-,,>c /-yU'exp{X'it, + S}J.

Let 11 • represent the minimum value of TJ neces sary for
a household to be able to lease in land, defined
by setting hT = LO:

11· = In [ 2L0<1-,,>c I I!exp{X'it, + OS}].

Scenario one

71' < 11·,

and

avTlaTJ > avo1a11 evaluated at 11·.

A necessary and sufficient condition for the secon d part
to hold for all households is that 2-y > I.
ahT!a11 > 0 and this parameter restriction ensur es that d?l"ldh
r is strictly positive (see the derivative under
the confi rmati on of [A2]).

In this scenario, households with 11

<

11' choos e to become landlords. Those with 11

> 11· are both
able and willing to become tenants and those in betwe
en cultivate their own land arid do not participate
in the leasing market.
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Scenario two

Again a necessary and sufficient condition for the second part is 2-y > 1. The level
of 11 at which
the value of leasing out equals the value of leasing in, i.e. where VT = Vu., is denoted
by .,,x. Setting VT
equal to Vu., one finds that

11x

= (1--y) [

- In{ [(1--y)/'Y]['YUexp{X'tt,

In{ LO [exp{(l-O)S} - 1]}

+ S}/q 11<1-r> - [exp{(l-8)S}][Uexp{X'tt, + 0S}/2C] 11(1-,>}

J.

For a household falling under this scenario, if 11 < if it prefers to lease out and
if.,, > .,,x it
prefers to lease in. (Note that in either case the minimum amount of leasing is bounded
away from zero.)
Households falling under this scenario never choose to be.non-participants.
It can readily be shown from the equations for 11' and.,,· that the first inequality can
occur only
in two situations, both involving imperfect information. First, if fJ < 1 it can occur
only for households
with S < 0. The intuition is that the situation of a household wanting to lease out
(11 < 11+) while being
able to lease in (11 > 11) can only arise if the household is not very skilled (hence the
desire to lease out)
but landlords are not aware of this negative quality (hence the ability to lease in).
The second case is if
fJ > 1 and S > 0. Here it is possible to find a household wanting to lease out
because of a low.,, but
simultaneously being able to lease in because landlords overestimate the household'~
skill level and hence
are willing to lease to them.

Scenario three
11'

< =>

r, ■,

and avT1a.,, S avo1a11 evaluated at.,,·.

In this scenario we have the phenomenon that at the levels of 11 at which other agents
are willing
to lease to a household, i.e. 71 greater than.,,·, the household prefers not to enter
the leasing market. It

is only at higher levels, indicated by .,,+, that the household is also willing to lease
in. The level of 11 at
which the curves cross,..,,+, is defined implicitly by VT = V but it does not have
an analytical solution.
0
In this scenario, households with 11

<

11' lease out. Those with 11

> .,,+ lease in. Those between

do not participate, either because they are not able
to ('17'
not to (r," < 71 < 71+).

<

r,

<

r,') or because they are able but prefer

As indicated unde r scenarios one and two, [2-y < IJ,
for any observed leasing behavior there are
some levels of S which are inconsistent with that behav
ior. In the case of non-participation this is dealt
with in the estimations by explicitly bounding S
to remain in scenario one where there is 1 strictly
positive probability of non-participation. In the case
where leasing occurs, inconsistent events are given
probability zero. (See the discussion unde r scenario
two and the definition of <J,(r,) in the text).
Similar issues arise if 2'Y > 1 but they are more diffic
ult to handle because 11 + does not have an
analytic expression. One can show that.,,+ exists
and is unique.
Uniqueness: Noting, as above, that
ahT!a71 > 0, and the fact that once the amount of land
available on lease to a household is attractive to
it (that is, greater than h), then increasing amounts
of land are even more so, it is clear that there can
be at most a single crossing of the Yr and V curve
s. Existence: Yr equals a tenant's total output times
0
his share, [1/2 + l/2(L O!hr )J. ahrfar, > 0 so the
share of total product received by a tenant approaches
a floor of 1/2 as r, increases. Since ay1a.,, > 0 and
a2ylar,ah > 0, the ratio of the output of a household
if it chooses to lease in relative to its output if it
cultivates only its owned land increases in r, witho
ut
bound. Thus there exists some level of 11 for whic
h Yr > V0 • (As LO - 0, .,,· - -oo and Yr > V
0
everywhere.) Because a crossing point exists and
is unique, given the equations for V and Yr it could
0
be estimated with a fixed point algorithm. However,
to do so - for every function evaluation - would
increase estimation time dramatically and add an addit
ional layer of approximation. As a practical matter,
starting values were chosen with 2-y < 1 and this
was never breached durin g estimation.
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